Trade Regulation—Resale Price Maintenance—Contracts Between Partially Integrated Corporations and Competing Wholesalers, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1956 Issue 4 
January 1956 
Trade Regulation—Resale Price Maintenance—Contracts Between 
Partially Integrated Corporations and Competing Wholesalers, 
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Trade Regulation—Resale Price Maintenance—Contracts Between Partially Integrated Corporations and 
Competing Wholesalers, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956), 1956 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 472 (1956). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss4/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the conduct is not indictable,33 the only sanctions available would be
suspension or disbarment.
TRADE REGULATION-RESALE PRICE MIMNTENANCE--CONTRACTS
BETWEEN PARTIALLY INTEGRATED CORPORATIONS AND
COMPETING WHOLESALERS
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. S05 (1956)
Defendant corporation, in addition to wholesaling the drug products
of various manufacturers, manufactures similar commodities which
are distributed through its wholesale outlets and through independent
wholesale outlets.' Defendant executed contracts with independent
wholesalers establishing stipulated resale prices for its products. The
Justice Department instituted a civil suit based upon the allegation
that since these "fair trade" agreements were executed with persons
with whom defendant competed, section one of the Sherman Antitrust
Act 2 had been violated. Defendant maintained that the contracts were
lawful under amendments which created specific statutory exceptions3
to the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court,4
held that the contracts were "illegal per se" under section one of the
act.5
Section one of the Sherman Act proscribes "every contract, combi-
nation . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . ." In two early
cases construing this section the Supreme Court evolved two impor-
tant doctrines. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States7 the Court stated
that only unreasonable restraints of trade were proscribed; but in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons," it was held that price fix-
ing agreements affecting interstate commerce were per se restraints
of trade under section one.9 Shortly after the Miles case fair trade
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952) provides that any person is liable to prosecution
by indictment if he corruptly or by threats or force endeavors to influence, intimi-
date, or impede any juror, witness, or officer in the discharge of his duty, or
obstruct the due administration of justice.
1. Defendant corporation consists of a single manufacturing division and 74
wholesale outlets. Its total sales for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1954, were
$338,000,000. The self-manufactured products furnished only $11,000,000, or
slightly more than 3% of the total sales. United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). See text supported by note 6
infra for the pertinent provision of this section.
3. Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952); McGuire
Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
4. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
5. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
6. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
7. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
9. The illegal per se rule was rigidly adhered to by the Court. Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (price fixing illegal
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENTS
began to receive state legislative and judicial recognition, 0 and by
1937 Congress had passed the Miller-Tydings Act", which, in effect,
permits verticai" resale price maintenance, commonly referred to as
"fair trade.'" , Under federal" and supplemental state fair trade
legislation " , a manufacturer may, by contract or agreement, prescribe
minimum or stipulated pricesl at which a wholesaler or retailer must
resell the manufacturer's product."7 A proviso preserves the illegality
ptwt ite even though only maximum prices were fixed); United States v. National
Ass'n of Leal Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (even though prices were not
mandatory) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (with-
out conside ation as to reasonableness).
It. New Jersey first legalized resale price maintenance by r uring sellers
,of gools to sell the commodities at prices established by the manfacturer. NJ.
Laws 11'13, c. 210. In Robert H. Ingersoll & Brother v. Hahne & Co., 89 N.J. Eq.
332, 1(8 AtL 128 (1918), a retailer was enjoined from reselling products at a
price below that fixed by the manufacturer. In 1931 the California legislature
passed the first fair trade statute which validated resale price maintenance
,ontrw t'. Cal. Laws 1931, c. 278. Two bills legalizing resale price maintenance
were rattoduced into Congress shortly after the Mies case, but neither came to a
vote. OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAirs 384-85 (1948).
1l. aX STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C, § 1 (1952).
12. [Vjertical price fixig [is] . .. the practice of fixing a price at which
one pet son moust sell a commnodity to another erson at a different level of the
dlistribution system." I CCH TRADE Rs REP 3001 (1954).
13, "~Resat; price maintenance laws (bearing the euphemistic title of 'Fair
Trade'; permit the manufacturer or producer of a trade-marked commodity- to
e stablish by contract minimum or stipulated wholesale and retail prices ...
Weston, tRetoe Price Maintenance and Market Integration: Fair Trade or Foul
Play? 22 GE,. WAsa. L. Rnr. 658, 659 (1954).
14. In 11052 the Atiller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952),
was supplemented by the passage of the McGuire Act, 66 STAT, 632, 15 U.S.C.§ 45 (19521), which provides that parties may by contract or agreement "prescribe
mninmu or stipulated prices for the resale of a commodity" and that such con-
tracts are binding on "persons who are not parties thereto." Many state fair
trade laws contain similar provisions. See, e.g., IM. ANN. STAT. C. 121%, § 189(1955), These "nonsigner" statutes are essential to effective fair trade legislation
since without such measures a manufacturer would be forced to execute agree-
ments with every outlet in the state in order to effectively fair trade his product.
The piassage of the McGuire Act was precipitated by a Supreme Court decision
which held that the Louisiana nonsigner provision was unenforceable as to goods
n intepstate cormuerce. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341
U.8. 384 (191). The Supreme Court later denied certiorari when the McGuire
Act was challenged on constitutional grounds. Sehweginann Bros. Giant
Super Marketq v. Eli Lilly & Co., 346 U.S. 856 (1953). An Illinois nonsigner pro-
vision was held constitutional as applied to goods m intrastate commerce. Old
Dearbot rt Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). See
I CCH Tmn REG. REP. i 3085 (1956) for developments concerning state con-
stituttonality of nonsigner provisions.
For a concise history of fair trade in the United States and for the English
origins of fair trade, see Bowman, The Prerequisites ad Efffets of Resale Price
Maintenance, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 825-49 (1955).
15, The federal statutes authorize fair trade only as to goods in interstate
commerce which are resold in states having fair trade legislation. 50 STAT. 693(1937). 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952); 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). Forty-five
states have enacted fair trade legislation. For complete texts of these statutes,
see 2 CCH TRADE RE. REP. ff 10001-5532 (1956).
16. The Miller-Tydings Act merely authorized the fixing of minimum prices
through fair trade agreements. 50 STxr. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). The
McGuire Act permits the parties to a fair trade agreement to stipulate the price
at which the commodity must be resold. 66 STAT. 631, 15 US.C. § 45 (1952).
17 See notes 12-13 s.pra.
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of horizontal price fixing, i.e., price maintenance agreements between
competitors. 18 Since a vertical, partially integrated corporation, such
as defendant, combines two or more successive stages in the manu-
facturing-distribution system and relies, for distribution, not only
upon its own outlets but also upon competing 9 independent outlets,2 0
the agreements in the principal case squarely presented the Court
with the issue whether contracts having both vertical and horizontal
aspects were within the Miller-Tydings exception to section one.
In the principal case, the majority opinion considered the issue as
"a narrow one of statutory interpretation,"' 21 and stated that the con-
tracts fell squarely within the proviso to Miller-Tydings which con-
tinues the proscription against price fixing agreements "between
wholesalers ... or between persons, firms or corporations in compe-
tition with each other. 2 2
There are certain immediate consequences of the instant decision
which may be considered to be unfair to a partially integrated corpor-
ation. From the adoption of the Miller-Tydings Act in 1937 until 1952
there seemed to be no question as to the validity of fair trade contracts
executed by these corporations :23 the antitrust division had never as-
sailed such agreements, and the Federal Trade Commission had recog-
nized their validity.24 During this period, many corporations had de-
18. "[H]orizontal price fixing... concerns the fixing of prices by persons who
are in competition with one another, that is, persons at the same level of dis-
tribution." 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 3001 (1954).
19. Defendant conceded that it was in competition with the wholesalers with
whom it executed the fair trade agreements. United States v. McKesson & Rob-
bins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 312 (1956); Brief for Appellees, p. 3, ibid.
20. Weston, supra note 13, at 673 & n.50. See also Hale, Vertical Integration:
Impact of the Antitrust Laws Upon Combinations of Successive Stages of Pro-
duction and Distribution, 49 CoLumI. L. REv. 921 (1949).
21. 351 U.S. at 309. The Court refused to consider any economic or policy
arguments in construing the statute. 351 U.S. at 315-16.
The dissenting opinion suggests that the majority was motivated in its decision
by a distaste for fair trade generally. "Lack of sympathy with an Act of Con-
gress does not justify giving to it a construction that cannot be rationalized in
terms of any policy attributable to Congress." 351 U.S. at 316 (dissenting
opinion).
Clearly there exists a sharp conflict as to whether fair trade is a desirable
economic policy. A substantial portion of the country's informed opinion con-
demns fair trade. See FTC Report on Resale Price Maintenance passim (1945);
ATTORNEY GENERAL's NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 149-55 (1955);
The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70. The Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts are sometimes cited as results of expert and lavish lobbying tech-
niques by the drug trade, rather than as evidence of deep-rooted congressional
convictions. See Weston, supra note 13, at 658 & n.2. In addition, it is to be noted
that Congress has never deemed it desirable to enact a fair trade law for the
District of Columbia.
22. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
23. For example, Eastman Kodak Company, a partially integrated corporation,
had obtained 39 injunctions enforcing its fair trade contracts against retailers
in various jurisdictions. Weston, supra, note 13, at 665.
24. Eastman Kodak Company, a partially integrated corporation, instituted an
action to vacate a previous cease and desist order of the FTC which had pre-
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veloped an effective distribution system through partial integration 5*
and, through the adoption of fair trade, had also protected a property
interest in their products, viz. goodwill." The principal case forces
these corporations to make a choice between undertaking a costly
distributive reorganization or discontinuing resale price mainte-
nance. Since fair trade agreements between partially integrated cor-
porations and their competing outlets are now held to violate the
Sherman Act, another consequence of the decision in the principal
case is that such corporations presumably are liable for treble dam-
ages to anyone injured2--at least insofar as the statute of limitations
will permit.-
Not expressly relying on these hardships to partially integrated cor-
porations, but apparently on the theory that a literal interpretation of
the statute would produce inconsistent results, the dissenting opinion
ventled the company from fair trading one of its products. The FTC vacated
the pi evious order. I CCH TRADE REG. REP. 3154.75 (1954). One writer believes
it extremely unlikely the FTC would have lifted the ban had it believed that these
fair trade agreements were illegal. Weston, supra note 13, at 661 n.14.
25. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 13, 1954, pp. 68, 71.
"GV There are said to be two principal justiacations for the adoption of fair
t4ade. (1) It allows manufacturers to protect their property interest in their
irrducts, viz, goodwill, by preventing the "cheapening" effects of price cutting,
Old ea1born Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193
( W36 1; Weston, supra note 13, at 659; (2) It protects small business from the
superi:r buying power of large chains, Bowman, supra note 14, at 833; Adams,
Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967, 973-74 (1955);
2 U.S Com CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2192-94 (1952).
27. In a proceeding before the FTC it was noted that the construction of the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts contended for by the government counsel came
rather late. It was stated that to construe these statutes in a manner rendering
fair trade agreements by partially integrated corporations unlawful "would re-
quire thousands of manufacturers, if they want to fair trade, to make major
changes in their present marketing methods with uncertain, but admittedly large
economic consequences." Eastman Kodak Co., FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
1954-1955 25291, at 35423 (FTC 1955). See also Weston, supra note I, at 680,
676 n.58 (statistics showing "tremendous" amount of partial integration today).
Theei are possibly three methods by which a partially integrated corporation
may effect resale price maintenance without the use of fair trade: (1) by in-
creased forward integration, United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948); (2) by refusing to deal unless prices are maintained, FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Rahl, Antitrust Policy in Vqrbution, 104
U. PA , L. REV. 185, 193 (1955); (3) by consignment or agency selling United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; United States v. General glee Co.,
272 U.S. 476 (1926).
28, .38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952); Weston, spr note 13, at 679.
29. Another syllogism which lends support to the dissenting opinion is that:
partial integration was widely utilized when the Miller-Tydings and M cGuire
Acts were passed; Congress is presumed to be aware of contemporaneous con-
ditions when it enacts legislation; therefore, Congress intended to allow partially
integrated corporations to fair trade. Eastman Kodak Co., FTC Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations 1954-1955 25291, at 35422-24 (FTC 1955). Most of the
cases cited in support of this logic, however, deal with Congress's knowledge of
contemporaneous events wldeh were sought to be corrected by the legislation.
See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1891). The
syllogism would seem to find support in Weston, supra note 13, at 680 where it is
stated that since there is no legislative history to the contrary, the partially
integrated concern should be permitted to fair trade.
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stated that there should be a departure from what appears to be
"clear" statutory language so that a consistent and rational intent
would be attributed to the legislature. 0 Thus, the dissenting opinion in
the instant case reasoned that: resale price maintenance by a non-inte-
grated corporation, e.g., one engaged solely in manufacturing, is
clearly lawful under Miller-Tydings; the immediate economic effect of
resale price maintenance is the same whether it is utilized by a non-
integrated or by a partially integrated corporation-in either case
resale price competition of the fair-traded product is eliminated;
therefore, to discriminate against the partially integrated corporation
by holding its fair trade agreements illegal is to attribute inconsisten-
cies to the congressional intent. Thus, the dissent concluded that the
statute should not be literally construed, but rather, the purpose and
policy underlying the statute should be determined and effectuated."'
This rationale is further supported by the fact that the only pertinent
legislative history would seem to indicate that perhaps Congress in-
tended to allow fair trading by such corporations.32
However, there appears to be some uncertainty as to whether elimi-
nation of resale price competition is the only economic effect of fair
trading by a partially integrated corporation. It has been asserted
that the use of fair trade by such a corporation is conducive to further
integration and that it may be used as a lever to "squeeze out" com-
petitors at another functional level.3 3 It has been further asserted
that since either use increases the likelihood of eventual monopoly,
30. 351 U.S. at 316. The dissenting opinion also seemed to indicate that since
the statute was ambiguous, to look behind the statutory wording in construing
it was justified. 351 U.S. at 318-19 (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 316-18 (dissenting opinion). The FTC, considering the precise
issue involved in the principal case, had reached a result contrary to that of the
majority opinion. One of the factors considered by the commission was that the
effect of the fair trade agreements in question would be the same whether the
corporation involved was partially integrated or non-integrated, i.e., in either
case there would be uniformity of resale prices. Eastman Kodak Co., FTC Com-
plaints, Orders, Stipulations 1954-1955 f 25291, at 35423 (FTC 1955).
32. Speaking in support of the McGuire Act, which contains a proviso almost
identical to that contained in Miller-Tydings, Senator Humphrey stated:
Under the bill, such firms [partially integrated corporations] may make
resale price-maintenance contracts ... because such contracts are vertical,
that is, between sellers and buyers. While in one sense firms in this position
function not only as producers but also as wholesalers and retailers, they
may still lawfully make contracts with other wholesalers and retailers, when
in making such contracts they act as producers of a trade marked or branded
commodity....
98 CONG. REc. 8870 (1952). The majority opinion attributed little significance to
the statement, noting that the Senator was not in charge of the bill, and that he
was not a member of any committee which considered the bill. Moreover, the
McGuire Act originated in the House, and was passed there prior to Senator
Humphrey's discussion. 351 U.S. at 313-14. See also Taft, C.J., in Railroad
Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922) (legislative history is
not pertinent when the statutory language is clear to the Court).
33. Note, Use of Resale P rice Maintenance by Integrated Manufacturers: A
New Loophole for Abuse of Monopoly Power, 64 YALE L.J. 426 (1955).
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partially integrated corporations should not be allowed to utilize the
fair trade device.-" In rebuttal, it has been said that since one of the
prime objectives of integration-the power to control prices-can be
effectively achieved through fair trade, the likelihood of further inte-
gration is reduced by the use of this price fixing device.m Very little
material has been found in which the economic effects of allowing the
combination of fair trade and partial integration have been consid-
ered. The few articles which attempt to examine the topic merely
serve to call attention to possible economic effects of allowing the
combination and are decidedly inconclusive 5
Thus, in the absence of a thorough, intensive study of the total eco-
nomic consequences of fair trading by a partially integrated corpora-
tion, it would appear that it cannot be accurately stated that to extend
the use of fair trade to such a corporation is or is not the same as to
allow a non-integrated corporation to utilize this marketing device2'
Such a study would seem desireable before a departure from clear
statutory language would be justified on the basis of economic ef-
fects;' Since a determination of these effects would involve a con-
sideration of many complex economic issues, it would be appropriately
conducted by the legislature through the use of its extensive investiga-
tory processes. It is submitted, therefore, that the majority of the
court was correct in refusing to depart from the clear wording of the
statute on the basis of a consideration of total economic effects when
:14., hh4
W-'+ eston, supra note 1$.
:;; See Weston, s'pra note 13; Note, 64 YALPE LJ. 426 (1955); Recent Develop-
nn'nts, 54 CoLUm. L. REV. 282 (1954).
: 7. Th" district court apparently realized that there may be economic conse-
qi nces other than the mere elimination of resale price competition of the fair
traded article. The Court stated that the fair trade agreements executed by
parttialy integrated corporations are not conclusively within Miller-Tydings, but
that the illegal per se rule would not be applied to the contracts without a show-
mg of "some additional" restraint of trade other than the mere elimination of
i'sae price competition. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp.
T1- (StN.Y. 19,54). in effect, the district court attempted to create a third
Zrup of price fixing contracts which would or would not be illegal, depending
upon whether, in a particular case, there was "some additional" restraint of
trad",. The Supreme Court rejected such an approach, stating that there is no
basis in the statute for attributing to Congress an intent to create a third cate-
gory of contracts: the legislature clearly intended to establish only two classes
o f price fixing contracts-those unlawful under the illegal per se rule and those
lawful under the Miller-Tydings Act. 351 U.S. at 810-11.
38. The dissenting opinion apparently felt that a departure from the statute
was justified by considering only the immediate economic effects of allowing the
partially integrated corporation to fair trade, i.e., the removal of resale price
competition on a particular commodity, rather than considering the total economic
consequences flowing from extending the marketing device to partially integrated
concerns. If this value judgment were to be accepted, the argument advocating
departure from the literal wording of the statute becomes very convincing, for
in that case it must be admitted that inconsistent results are being reached under
the statute.
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conflicting, inadequately-supported economic arguments were pre-
sented.3 9
The majority holding is further supported by the doctrine of the
"plain meaning rule" which requires that where statutory language
is clear and a literal construction of the statute will not lead to
"absurd" 40 results, "the words employed are to be taken as an expres-
sion of the meaning intended.' 14 1 In addition, since Miller-Tydings is
an exception to a basic policy against any price fixing, the Court's nar-
row construction of the statute was justified.4 2 If the principal case is
not in accord with the legislative intent, or if Congress should deter-
mine that the instant decision places an onerous burden on partially
integrated corporations, it now has the opportunity to make its in-
tention clear.
39. The conflicting economic arguments offered to the Court were apparently
based on a student note, Note, 64 YALE L.J. 426 (1955), and an article, Weston,
supra note 13.
40. Even if the approach of the dissenting opinion is adopted-that inconsistent
results are reached under the statute-it does not seem that the results are
"absurd" under the plain meaning rule. See Marshall, C.J., in Sturges v. Crown-inshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819) (absurdity must be so momentous
that all mankind would without hesitation reject application of rule); United
States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868) (absurdity must shock general
moral and common sense).
41. United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). On the plain
meaning rule, see generally 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION &§ 4701-06(3d ed. 1943). See Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extriinsio Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939) for an evaluation
of the plain meaning rule and its application. The author is of the opinion that
the rule may be of little value.
42. 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 41, § 4933.
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